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COMMENT: ACCOUNTABILITY AND
INDEPENDENCE IN FINANCIAL
REGULATION: CHECKS AND BALANCES,
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, AND OTHER
INNOVATIONS
MICHAEL S. BARR*
I
INTRODUCTION
Financial regulation attempts to balance two competing administrative
goals. On the one hand, as with much of administrative law, accountability is a
core goal. Accountability undergirds the democratic legitimacy of
administrative agencies. On the other hand, unlike with much of administrative
1
law, independence plays a critical role. Independence helps to protect financial
regulatory agencies from political interference and—with some important
caveats—arguably helps to guard against some forms of industry capture. In
addition, with respect to the Federal Reserve (the Fed), independence serves to
improve the credibility of the Fed’s price stability mandate by insulating its
decisionmaking from politics and, in particular, from the political pressure in
favor of easy money during election cycles.
These values, of course, are in tension. “Too much” accountability—at least
in some forms—may reduce independence. “Too much” independence—at
least in some forms—may reduce accountability. Moreover, steps to meet one
or the other of these goals may also affect the efficacy of the organization.
Having a financial regulatory system that properly balances accountability and
independence, but fails to protect households from abuse and the real economy
from the catastrophic failure of the financial sector, cannot be anyone’s goal.
To foster accountability, scholars of administrative law have looked to
2
congressional oversight, presidential control, and judicial review. Each of these
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1. See Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving
Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.
3, 2015 at 129.
2. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2246, 2253–72, 2281–
319 (2001) (describing several approaches to presidential administration).
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has its own weakness and has been the subject of extensive academic debate,
but, as has been pointed out elsewhere in this issue, this literature is often not
3
concerned with, or even aware of, the literature discussing financial regulation.
Yet financial regulation often raises unique problems that may not neatly align
with the literature on administrative law mechanisms of congressional
oversight, presidential control, or judicial review. In the context of financial
regulation, congressional oversight may be somewhat muted, for example, by
the budgetary independence of most financial regulatory agencies. That
budgetary independence is designed in part to reduce the ability of the financial
industry to lobby Congress to cut or condition agency funding on particular
enforcement or regulatory outcomes. Congress also tends to delegate to
financial agencies significant, core questions regarding financial institution
supervision, such as capital rules. Presidential control of financial agencies is
often viewed with some suspicion, out of fear of improper political interference
in enforcement and supervision, and since the New Deal, financial regulatory
agencies have been given a great deal of independence through a range of
4
practices. Although judicial review plays an important role in cabining financial
agency action, such oversight exists at the edges, with significant aspects of
financial regulation committed to agency discretion under broad congressional
delegations. Many financial regulatory decisions involve probabilistic judgments
about risk, such as whether a bank’s failure might lead to financial panics, which
are not readily subject to judicial second-guessing.
Moving from the mechanisms of oversight to its procedural norms, an
important aspect of legitimacy is transparency and expertise: showing that the
decisionmaking is based on the right substantive standard and arrived at
through the right procedural means—on informed, data-driven expertise rather
5
than on some arbitrary basis. An expertise-driven model began as a response to
the market failures that spurred the Great Depression and the resulting demand
6
for regulatory action. Unsurprisingly, administrative agency expertise is one of
7
the primary factors shaping judicial review of agency action. Further,
transparency in financial regulation has long been championed in the United
States. Justice Brandeis, pointedly writing about the risks of oversized financial
8
trusts, famously called sunlight “the best of disinfectants.” Transparency
reinforces procedural norms and buttresses substantive outcomes by engaging
3. See Gillian E. Metzger, supra note 1, at 130–31.
4. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 777 (2013).
5. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 515–53 (2003) (arguing that a model focusing more
directly on arbitrariness, rather than presidential control, suggests new posibilities for solving the
problem of agency legitimacy).
6. Id. at 471.
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2072
(1990).
8. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 89 (Melvin
I. Urofksy ed., 1995) (1914).
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the public.
In addition, independence from political influence has been an important
part of agency formation and an important measure of expertise-driven
9
decisionmaking. The typical features identified in such agencies frequently
include for-cause agency-head removal, tenure protection, and other measures,
10
which vary significantly by agency. Historically, financial regulatory agencies,
11
particularly the Fed, have retained independence from the Presidency. Even
financial regulatory agencies, such as the SEC that lack explicit at-will removal
protection, have come to be understood to enjoy removal protection simply by
12
virtue of their functional role and objective. Although independence serves
important values, a substantial drawback to multiagency independence in the
financial regulatory context has been the problem of turf wars and conflicting
approaches to regulation without a means of effective presidential coordination
13
and dispute resolution.
Professor Kathryn Judge helpfully points out in this issue that soft norms
can play an important role in reinforcing both independence and accountability.
While acknowledging that independence and accountability can be in tension
with one another, Judge argues that soft constraints, such as the reputation of
the Fed Chair, or principles for conducting monetary policy, can reinforce the
legitimacy of institutions that otherwise may not sufficiently reflect democratic
14
values of accountability, without undermining agency independence. These
soft constraints may help to mediate between these competing values without
requiring Congress to have chosen sharply in favor of one or the other in any
particular issue. Soft law itself, however, as Judge points out, may ossify into
something less useful, pushing regulators to continue on a path that no longer
15
makes sense; one of the defining reasons why Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
was successful in tackling the financial crisis from 2007 through 2009 was that he
was willing to break free from the soft constraints of prior Fed policy and
16
aggressively attack the panic.
In addition to balancing independence and accountability, the financial
regulatory system has to produce results. At a minimum, that means protecting
households, businesses, taxpayers and the real economy from abusive practices
and catastrophic collapse. In the lead-up to the financial crisis of 2008, however,

9. Datla & Revesz, supra note 4, at 770–71.
10. Id. at 786, 789, 792, 797, 804.
11. See Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503,
504–05 (2000).
12. Patrick Jiang, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB: In Which A Great Case Makes Bad Law, 92
B.U. L. REV. 701, 725 (2012).
13. See Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation:
Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1434–35 (1991).
14. See generally Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints, 78 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 65.
15. Id. at 68–87.
16. Id. at 78–84.
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the financial sector piled ill-considered risk upon risk, held lower and lower
levels of capital as a buffer against loss, engaged in practices that misled and
harmed consumers and investors, and ultimately put the whole U.S. economy at
risk. During this period, regulators failed to meet the basic substantive goals of
financial oversight.
In addition to soft law, other techniques may be used to mediate the tension
between independence and accountability while maintaining a focus on efficacy.
In particular, I want to briefly examine how regulatory checks and balances,
public engagement, and other innovations can help to promote accountability
while preserving independence. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the
Obama Administration (in which I served) worked with Congress to enact
major reforms aimed at substantively improving the safety of the financial
system. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (Dodd–Frank) put in place new oversight of “shadow banking,”
established a process to wind down major financial firms in the event of
collapse, reined in risky derivative and other trading and financing activities,
improved supervision of major financial firms, and strengthened consumer and
investor protections.
In doing so, Congress did not legislate on a blank slate, but instead sought to
reform the existing regulatory infrastructure, which is decidedly non-Platonic in
shape and form. Although Dodd–Frank was able to eliminate one of the worst
performing regulatory agencies, the Office of Thrift Supervision, much of the
superstructure of the financial regulatory system remained intact. Political turf
battles in Congress and among the regulatory agencies meant that some
common-sense changes to the financial “org chart,” such as merging the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), or fully clarifying the bank supervisory
responsibilities among the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) were
impossible to achieve. That meant that Dodd–Frank had to use other methods
to reduce opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, industry capture, and gaps in
supervision and regulation.
Moreover, even in countries that had much simpler regulatory structures,
such as the United Kingdom, the financial crisis hit with devastating
consequences. The UK had a “single peak” regulator before the crisis; that is,
one regulatory body, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), regulated the
entire financial services industry. In principle, this market-wide view would
permit the regulator to see risks across the market and to respond to them
quickly. In addition, the FSA was independent of the government and of the
Bank of England. In principle, this independence would leave the FSA free to
focus on the efficiency and safety of the financial system, without regard to
monetary policy or political goals. In practice, the FSA was overwhelmed by the
force of the financial crisis, and the Bank of England, which was called upon to
provide liquidity to the system, was not sufficiently aware of the scale and scope
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of the problems to be effective. Since the crisis, the UK has moved to a “twin
peaks” model, with prudential regulation moved back within the Bank of
England. Ideal organizational form, it appears, is neither necessary nor
sufficient for preventing or fighting financial crises.
In crafting Dodd–Frank, we consciously set out to develop and enact
innovative ways of advancing the accountability, independence, and efficacy of
the regulatory system, while working within severe political constraints of the
legislative process. We focused on improving how regulators: (1) interact and
coordinate, (2) respond to new and overlooked problems, (3) gather and assess
information, and (4) remain accountable to the public. Although we could not
eliminate turf battles, we sought methods to encourage or force better agency
coordination; reduce or eliminate differences in the regulation of functionally
similar products, services, or institutions; and reduce opportunities for races to
the bottom in regulatory oversight. We sought to instill positive incentives for
regulatory checks and balances, and to engage the public in increasing the
accountability of the regulatory agencies. We also took those same values into
account in crafting the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
17
Disclosure Act of 2009 (the CARD Act), which was designed to eliminate bad
practices in the credit card markets. The remainder of this comment briefly
outlines some examples of these administrative innovations, although, given
space constraints, fuller exposition will need to await another time.
II
REGULATORY CHECKS AND BALANCES
Given the fractured nature of the U.S. regulatory system, the Dodd–Frank
Act created a new federal entity, the Financial Stability Oversight Council
18
(FSOC), to look out for risks across the financial system, designate
systemically important firms and markets for heightened supervision and
regulation regardless of the charter or corporate form of the financial entity,
coordinate across regulatory agencies, and try to make sure that prudential
standards promulgated by agencies are sufficiently robust to protect against
systemic risk. The Council consists of the heads of the financial regulatory
agencies, with the Secretary of Treasury serving as Chairperson, and each of the
19
primary agency heads having one vote. Nonvoting members also participate in
the Council. The FSOC’s authorities fill important gaps in the system and help
to reduce the risk of regulatory arbitrage.
The FSOC is given the authority to nudge the prudential regulators into
20
action. If the Council determines that particular financial activities are creating
17. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123
Stat. 1734 (2009).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 5321(a) (2012).
19. § 5321(b).
20. § 5330. We initially favored a more robust approach, under which the FSOC could ultimately
force the agency to raise standards. A number of agencies objected, in part arguing that the FSOC
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or increasing the risk of significant stress to the nation’s financial markets, it is
authorized to issue recommendations to the primary federal regulatory agencies
21
to heighten their regulatory standards. The prudential regulators are required
to put these recommendations into place, or to explain publicly why they are
22
not implementing them. The FSOC must then report to Congress on the
23
responsiveness of the regulator to its recommendations. This system enables
the group of agency heads to place pressure on a recalcitrant or lagging member
agency. It can also help to reduce the risk of uneven regulation among agencies.
Furthermore, the public nature of the process enlists not only Congress but,
24
perhaps more importantly, the public to exert pressure on the agency to act.
For example, in November 2012, the FSOC began taking public comment
on a proposed recommendation to the SEC providing for three alternative
25
options for reform to money market funds. This came just forty-seven days
after SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro announced that, due to lack of support
from a majority of commissioners, the SEC would be unable to advance
26
proposed money market fund reforms. The SEC’s recalcitrance prompted the
FSOC, under the urging of Treasury Secretary Geithner and SEC Chairman
27
Schapiro, to issue its “Section 120 proposal.” Responding to this action, the
28
SEC issued its own proposal on money market fund reforms. The SEC has
finalized the rule, and although it falls far short of the FSOC’s proposals, the
actions are at least more robust than those contemplated before the FSOC’s
prodding.
The FSOC also possesses the power to seek to resolve disputes between
29
feuding agencies under its jurisdiction. To trigger this authority, agencies in a
dispute must be unable to resolve the conflict through good faith effort, and one
30
agency must provide a written request for the Council’s involvement. FSOC
recommendations must provide a written explanation and must be approved
31
through a two-thirds vote. The recommendations issued by the FSOC are

might, under the guise of purporting to raise standards, actually lower them, while others simply sought
to protect their turf under the guise of “independence” from the FSOC, on the grounds that it was
chaired by a presidentially appointed Treasury Secretary.
21. § 5330(a).
22. § 5330(c)(2).
23. § 5330(d).
24. See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New
Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689 (2013).
25. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2013 ANN. REP. 129 (2013).
26. Dwight C. Smith, Money Market Funds: FSOC Proposes Reforms, HARV. LAW SCHOOL
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Dec. 9, 2012, 10:11 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/09/money-market-funds-fsoc-proposes-reforms/.
27. Id.
28. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Money Market Fund
Reforms (June 5, 2013) (on file with author).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 5329 (2012).
30. § 5329(a).
31. § 5329(b)–(c).
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32

nonbinding, but create a forceful public statement that should place pressure
on the parties to the dispute.
In addition, the FSOC includes measures intended to maintain its
accountability to both the President and Congress. Through the Secretary of the
Treasury, who is also the Chair of the FSOC, the President retains important
33
oversight of the FSOC. The FSOC also has annual reporting duties to
34
Congress. The voting members of the Council are independently required to
35
attest to their views of the FSOC’s efforts at mitigating systemic risk, and if the
member believes that the Council is not up to the task, the member’s statement
36
must outline the steps that they believe are necessary to be taken.
Additionally, the Secretary of the Treasury, in her capacity as Chair, must
37
testify before Congress to discuss the annual report.
Dodd–Frank also created the Office of Financial Research (OFR), a new
agency lacking its own “turf” in the sense that it does not directly supervise or
regulate financial institutions. Instead, OFR is tasked with gathering
information across the financial market, as well as providing research for the
38
Financial Stability Oversight Council and its member agencies. It also has
rulemaking authority to standardize and collect data from financial institutions
39
and markets. Critically, OFR can act as an independent voice regarding
financial stability, serving as a counterweight to the Fed and other supervisory
agencies. In doing so, the OFR must report annually to Congress on threats to
40
financial stability. A robust OFR could provide an important check and
balance to other regulatory agencies, and provide incentives to them to improve
41
their own performance or risk being called out. A dedicated OFR may also
42
help regulation keep up with financial innovation and risk modeling.
The FSOC and OFR can serve as counterweights to the financial industry as
well as to other regulatory agencies. The FSOC and OFR can help reduce risks
from regulatory arbitrage in a fractured regulatory system by implementing a
series of requirements for joint rulemaking, or alternatively, requirements that
43
standards of one set of agencies be at least as stringent as another’s. “B team”
analysis of systemic risk, the ability to gather data throughout the financial
32. § 5329(d).
33. § 5321(b)(1)(A).
34. § 5322(a)(2)(N).
35. § 5322(b).
36. § 5322(b)(2).
37. § 5322(c).
38. § 5342–5343.
39. § 5343(c).
40. § 5344(d).
41. Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd–Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: Strengths,
Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 184 (2012).
42. Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd–Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and
Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 549 (2011).
43. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 712(a)(8), § 731(e)(2), § 165(i)(2)(C), § 619, § 941(b), § 1471, § 205(h), §
165(d)(8).
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system (regardless of supervisory jurisdiction), and the ability to force public
debate over regulatory standards and jurisdictional lines through public
“nudges” may prove to be critical in a world in which the regulatory
architecture is far from ideal and in which systemic risk analytics remain an
uncertain and evolving field. Together with a newly invigorated Federal
Reserve, charged with overseeing systemically important firms and markets,
these new entities may help to reduce the risk that our next financial crisis
crushes the real economy.
III
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
Public engagement is another key strategy to help independent agencies
remain accountable, and to help them stay focused on substantive regulation
that meets the needs of households and businesses. Dodd–Frank established a
new agency to look out for the interest of households: the Consumer Financial
44
Protection Bureau (CFPB). Although formally housed within the Federal
Reserve System to lessen political opposition to the creation of a new agency,
the CFPB has strong, statutorily provided independence from the Fed (and the
President) on policy, enforcement, budget, regulatory, and all other matters.
Other features contributing to the CFPB’s independence include a single
45
Director with a five-year term who is removable only for cause, and automatic
funding through earnings of the Federal Reserve System, subject to a cap,
46
rather than congressional appropriations.
Balanced against its independence are carefully crafted provisions to ensure
that the Bureau remains publicly accountable for its accomplishments and
failures. The Director is required to appear twice a year before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the House
47
Committees on Financial Services and Energy and Commerce. In anticipation
of these meetings, the CFPB is required to compile a comprehensive report, to
48
be submitted to the Committees and to the President. This report is required
to include a discussion of obstacles to consumer financial well-being, a
justification of the Bureau’s budget, a list of significant rules and orders adopted
by the Bureau and the plans for the coming period, an analysis of consumer
complaints, a list of supervisory and enforcement actions, an analysis of its
actions taken with respect to nonbanks, and an analysis of efforts to meet
49
diversity and fair lending objectives. This extensive array of reporting
requirements forces the Bureau to demonstrate to Congress on a continuous
basis that it is working to accomplish its mission.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012).
§ 5491(b)–(d).
§ 5497(a).
§ 5496(a).
§ 5496(b).
§ 5496(c).
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Another strategy to engage the public is through crowdsourcing of data.
Although data collection is a traditional function of administrative agencies,
Dodd–Frank broke new ground by coupling it with public engagement—for
example, through the consumer complaint function. The Act mandates that the
Bureau set in place procedures to provide consumers with timely responses to
50
their complaints. Such complaints are to follow a particular procedure,
whereby the complaints submitted are to be provided by the CFPB to the
51
regulated entity, which in turn provides relevant information to the consumer.
The Bureau is required to provide a summary of the procedures taken and
52
53
responses received. Further, it actively solicits consumer complaints and has
54
handled hundreds of thousands of complaints over the last two years.
55
In addition to investigating individual consumer complaints, the CFPB uses
the information from consumers to analyze and prioritize issues for supervisory,
56
enforcement, and regulatory action. The CFPB also releases consumer57
complaint data publicly under its reporting duty. This database provides a new
58
tool for the agency and the public to hold financial institutions accountable.
The CFPB also has new tools to engage private financial institutions in
improving disclosures. For example, the CFPB can grant safe harbors to permit
private firms to experiment with providing consumers with innovative
disclosures that may better meet household needs than the current approach.
59
The CARD Act also embodies reform through public engagement. Now
administered by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the CARD Act
utilizes information-gathering and publication procedures similar to those in the
60
consumer-complaint mechanism. For example, the CARD Act amends the
Truth in Lending Act to create new electronic disclosure requirements for
61
credit card companies. Creditors are required to maintain a website on which
62
all written credit card agreements must be provided. They are further required

50. § 5534(a).
51. § 5534(b)–(c).
52. § 5534(b).
53. See
Submit
a
Complaint,
CONSUMER
FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
54. 2014 CFPB CONSUMER RESPONSE ANN. REP. at 12.
55. Id. at 38.
56. Id. at 2.
57. See § 5496(c); see also Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
58. See Lee Drutman, A Win for Open Data: CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database, SUNLIGHT
FOUNDATION (Apr. 22, 2013, 3:44 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/04/22/
consumer_complaint/.
FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
BUREAU,
59. CARD
Act
Factsheet,
CONSUMER
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/credit-card-act/feb2011-factsheet/ (last visited Mar. 25,
2015).
60. Id.
61. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d) (2012).
62. § 1632(d)(1).
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to turn over these contracts in electronic form to the CFPB. In turn, the CFPB
is required to provide these contracts publicly on its site in a readily accessible
64
form. Consumer advocacy organizations and third party vendors can use this
data to put competitive pressure on firms to improve consumer protections and
price transparency in credit card contracts.
IV
CONCLUSION
The financial crisis sparked innovations in substantive financial regulation
and administrative law designed to balance independence and accountability,
while improving the efficacy of financial oversight. In many respects, these
innovations acknowledge that our regulatory infrastructure is far from ideal, but
they would be essential even in far simpler and perhaps more preferable
regulatory structures. Only time will tell whether these innovations will be
enough to overcome not only regulatory turf battles and congressional
inattention or hostility, but also industry lobbying and the pace of financial
innovation. The financial sector has already challenged a number of these
policies, both in Congress and in the courts. Putting in place regulatory checks
and balances, increasing transparency, and engaging the public can be bulwarks
against complacency and the slide towards amnesia, willful or otherwise, about
the causes and consequences of our most recent and brutal financial crisis. But
the fight over financial reform is far from over, and whether the public will win
out in the end is far from assured. Changing finance so that it is fairer and safer,
and better harnessed to the needs of the real economy is, or ought to be, our
shared challenge.

63. § 1632(d)(2).
64. § 1632(d)(3).

